The role of reported speech in the evaluation of arguments from expert opinion

Monielly Serafim

Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), Brasil
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6739-3799

Revisão de língua inglesa: Lucas Pereira da Silva (USP)

This paper discusses how grammatical aspects of direct and indirect speech affect the evaluation of the argument from expert opinion. These grammatical structures have different pragmatic effects mainly because in direct speech the reported content is assumed to be accurate in both form and content. In contrast, in indirect speech the speaker embeds the reported content in their own speech. The corpus analyzed consisted of 24 essays written by candidates applying to the Brazilian National High School Exam (ENEM). This paper provides a comparative analysis of the types of reported speech found in arguments from expert opinion in these essays and their relation to Wagemans’ (2011) argument scheme and critical questions, as well as proposes modifications in the existing argument schemes to enable a more precise evaluation of arguments.

Keywords: Argument evaluation. Reported speech. Expert opinion. Fallacy.

The role of reported speech in the evaluation of arguments from expert opinion

O papel do discurso relatado na avaliação de argumentos de autoridade

Este artigo discute como aspectos gramaticais do discurso direto e indireto afetam a avaliação do argumento a partir da opinião de especialistas. Essas estruturas gramaticais têm efeitos pragmáticos diferentes, principalmente porque, no discurso direto, o conteúdo relatado é assumido como fiel em forma e conteúdo, enquanto, no discurso indireto, o falante atual incorpora o conteúdo relatado em sua fala. O corpus analisado consiste em 24 redações escritas por candidatos do Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio (ENEM). Este artigo oferece uma análise comparativa dos tipos de discurso relatado encontrados em argumentos de autoridade nesses textos e sua relação com o esquema argumentativo e com questões críticas de Wagemans (2011), bem como oferece modificações nos esquemas argumentativos existentes para permitir uma avaliação mais precisa dos argumentos.


El papel del discurso referido en la evaluación de argumentos de autoridad

Este artículo analiza cómo los aspectos gramaticales del discurso directo e indirecto afectan la evaluación del argumento basado en la opinión de expertos. Estas estructuras gramaticales tienen diferentes efectos pragmáticos, principalmente porque, en el discurso directo, se supone que el contenido referido es fiel en forma y contenido, mientras que, en el discurso indirecto, el hablante actual incorpora el contenido referido en su habla. El corpus analizado consta de 24 ensayos escritos por candidatos del Examen Nacional de Enseñanza Media (ENEM). Este artículo ofrece un análisis comparativo de los tipos de discurso referido presentes en argumentos de autoridad en estos textos y su relación con el esquema argumentativo y los temas críticos de Wagemans (2011) y ofrece modificaciones a los esquemas argumentativos existentes para permitir una evaluación más precisa de los argumentos.

Introduction

Although logical theories consider the argument from authority as fallacious by nature, many works on argumentation from a pragma-dialectical perspective (EEMEREN et al., 2014; WAGEMANS, 2011; WALTON, 1997) acknowledge this type of argument as legitimate under certain circumstances. Walton et al. (2008, p. 12) mention that the argument from authority is defeasible and open to critical questioning. Consequently, it is essential to distinguish between fallacious and non-fallacious cases. To do so, Walton (2006, p. 87) proposes an argument scheme and critical questions, which are dealt with in more detail in section 2.2.

Given that this type of argument is often conveyed by direct and indirect speech (DS and IS henceforth), this paper investigates if and how these two grammatical structures should play a role in argument evaluation. To achieve this goal, we analyze and compare arguments from expert opinion in 24 essays from the Brazilian National High School Exam (ENEM) (BRASIL, 2017; 2018; 2019).

The notion of reported speech adopted here is the incorporation of someone else’s words into one’s speech. According to Aikhenvald (2011, p. 290), a speech report involves at least two speakers, i.e. the speaker source of the original speech and ‘the reporter’. In DS, the words reported are those of the source, whereas in IS the speaker adapts the original words to communicate their own perspective.

Previous works have considered the relation between reported speech and argumentation (SMIRNOVA, 2012; 2009; ZLATKOVA, 2012), yet they focus on the argumentative function of these structures in press discourse. Other studies focus on arguments from expert opinion and their evaluation but do not consider the grammatical structure in argument evaluation (WAGEMANS, 2011; WALTON, 1997). Recently, Gobbo et al. (2022) investigated reported speech incorporating the notion of “voice” into the framework of Adpositional Argumentation, developed by Gobbo & Benini (2011). This paper, however, seeks to understand how grammatical aspects of reported speech might affect the evaluation of the argument with regard to the critical questions used in the analysis, consequently contributing to the works on argument evaluation and promoting a dialogue between argumentation and grammatical studies.

The main question this paper aims to answer is how the types of speech (DS and IS) play a role in argument evaluation. The general underlying hypothesis is that linguistic structures could affect the evaluation of the arguments: on the one hand,
for instance, one may expect that, if an instance of DS is fallacious, it might be related to the authenticity of reproduction of a discourse act. On the other hand, as in IS the entire communicated content is uttered by the speaker, other questions might likely play a more central role in specifying whether there is a fallacy.

This paper is presented as follows: Section 1 briefly reviews reported speech structures and offers a summary of the main issues about the structure of arguments from expert opinion and its evaluation through critical questions. Section 2 presents the methodology of the study. Section 3 shows the analysis of the arguments in the corpus and discusses the correlations between types of reported speech and critical questions. Finally, I present the conclusions.

1 An account of reported speech and argument from expert opinion

This section introduces the main concepts used in the analysis. Section 1.1 briefly presents how reported speech can be coded in language and its main features. Section 1.2 offers the relevant notions related to argumentation from expert opinion and its evaluation forms.

1.1 Reported speech

From an argumentative perspective, reported speech has not received attention concerning the difference between DS and IS. However, authors do have considered the role of quotations in argumentation. Walton and Macagno (2011, p. 28) argue that

quotations are not only reported propositions, but acts in a discourse aimed at pursuing a specific communicative goal. Quotations are not merely repetitions of past assertions, but reminders of past commitments [...].

In this sense, they can be used by an interlocutor to hold the discussant accountable for their past commitments in light of their current viewpoint. As such, quotations might be taken out of context or misquoted by the interlocutor to hold a personal attack against the discussant, which usually entails ad hominem and straw man fallacies.

Carrascal (2014) considers quotations in arguments from expert opinion in philosophical academic papers to show that critical questions related to the argument scheme proposed by Walton (2006) do not actually apply. The author considers citations as ‘testimonial practices’ and, as such, the institutional context in which they appear must be taken into consideration when analyzing them.
Carrascal (2014) argues that if a claim made in a published paper is not accepted, this is rarely because of the unacceptability of citations; in fact, a critical reader is most likely to react to the claim itself rather than question if it is a misquotation.

These works, however, do not make a distinction between direct or indirect speech and its features. Even though, grammatically, there are many forms of reported speech, this paper deals only with cases in which the reported speech is explicitly marked, such as the case of DS (1) and IS (2).

(1) Mary said: “I’m ill”.

(2) Mary said she was ill.

As pointed out by many authors, amongst them Aikhenvald (2011, p. 293-294), Keizer (2009, p. 847), and Vandelanotte (2004), DS involves different types of deictic shifts, as each speech event has its speaker, mood, and time and place of the utterance. What is often considered the main difference between DS and IS is the shift in personal deixis centre: in DS, the speaker gives the floor to the source of information, which allows the presence of two “selves” with different references, whereas IS lacks such shift (AIKHENVALD, 2011, p. 293; Vandelanotte, 2004, p. 491-493).

In a well-known article on the semantics of reported speech, Wierzbicka (1974, p. 272) points out what she calls one of the essential features of DS: its “‘theatrical’, playful, imaginary character” since the current speaker could even imitate the intonation and other features of the original utterance.

Given its nature, DS aims for a verbatim reproduction or at least a close word-to-word reproduction. Contrarily, IS is characterized by allowing freedom of reproduction (Zlatkova, 2012, p. 380), as the reported discourse is embedded in the current speaker’s discourse, who is responsible for creating a new context for the reported words. On this feature of IS, Coulmas (1986, p. 1) had already pointed out that the speaker can “blend information about an utterance with information about the world not conveyed by that utterance”, which allows the ambiguity in the following sentence.

(3) John asked me to dance with his hysterical wife (COULMAS, 1986, p. 4).

Coulmas (1986, p. 4) argues that ‘hysterical’ is unlikely to be John’s evaluation of his wife; instead, in such a case, it must be the speaker who ascribes this property to John’s wife. This ambiguity does not arise from DS, as the speaker does not interfere with the reported content. The author concludes that DS and IS differ in
faithfulness to the form of the reported content and differ in the processing of the content.

In light of these grammatical and argumentative features, section 3 discusses the evaluation of arguments from expert opinion and how critical questions should be adapted to account for DS and IS specificities.

1.2 The pragma-dialectical perspective and the argument from expert opinion

From a pragma-dialectical perspective (VAN EEMEREN; GROOTENDORST, 1984; VAN EEMEREN; SNOECK HENKEMANS, 2016), argumentation aims at resolving a difference of opinion or a disagreement through critical reasoning. In this view, there are argumentative moves by a protagonist who puts forward a standpoint and by an antagonist who questions the acceptability of the standpoint. As such, argumentation is understood as a social and rational activity.

The disagreement always occurs between two parties; however, it might be explicit when both parties explicitly express their opinions, or implicit when only one of the parties expresses their opinion. The latter is usually found in written texts, such as the essays in our corpus. In such a case, the writer anticipates the other party’s doubts and gives arguments to support their standpoint.

Regarding the nature of fallacies, Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984, p. 182) consider them “every violation which may result in the resolving of the dispute being made more difficult or even impossible”. In the context of the pragma-dialectical perspective, the resolution of disputes should be guided by rules (VAN EEMEREN; GROOTENDORST, 1984; 1987) that allow the speakers to conduct themselves as rational discussants; in doing so, the parties prevent fallacies, that is, speech acts that often obstruct the resolution of a difference in opinion.

In logical theories, arguments from authority are fallacies; however, in a pragma-dialectical view, they are a legitimate type of argument that can be challenged. In order to explain fallacies involved in the argument from authority, a few authors have proposed a distinction between types of arguments from authority based on the notions of cognitive, deontic, and administrative authority (see Koszowy and Walton (2019) for a review on types of authority).

To decide if an argument from expert opinion is fallacious, Walton (2006, p. 87) proposes the following argument scheme and critical questions:
ARGUMENT SCHEME

Source Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.

Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false).

Warrant Premise: If source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A, and E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false), then A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).

Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

1. Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?

Wagemans (2011, p. 334) argues that the questions are indeed relevant; however, some criticisms can be made regarding how the questions relate to the argument scheme. Although the trustworthiness, consistency, and backup evidence questions relate to the warrant premise, it is unclear how the remaining questions relate to the scheme. Wagemans also examines the suitability of the questions for evaluating the quality of arguments, as questions 2, 4, and 5 demand a binary yes-no answer, while question 1 requires a gradual statement as an answer and question 6 requires a full proposition. He also argues that question 6 does not evaluate the quality of the evidence but rather its existence.

Alternatively, Wagemans (2011, p. 335) proposes a different argument scheme combining Walton’s proposal and the pragma-dialectical account for arguments of expert opinion that will be the starting point of the discussion in section 3.

ARGUMENT SCHEME

1. O is true or acceptable.
   1.1 O is asserted by expert E.
      1.1.1a E is an expert in the relevant field F.
      1.1.1b Source S proves that O is asserted by E.
      1.1’ Accepting that O is asserted by E renders acceptable that O is true or acceptable.
      1.1’.1a E is personally reliable.
      1.1’.1b E is able to provide further evidence for O.
      1.1’.1c O is consistent with what other (types of) experts on F assert.
In Wagemans’ scheme, 1 represents the standpoint defended by the speaker. Arguments 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b are evidence supporting the argument in 1.1. The expertise and the field questions proposed by Walton (2006, p. 87) address the doubts regarding argument 1.1.1a, but Walton’s opinion question addresses the argument in 1.1.1b. The arguments in 1.1’.1a, 1.1’.1b, and 1.1’.1c support the reconstruction of the unexpressed premise through the ‘acceptability transfer principle’ (APT) in 1.1’. These arguments can be correlated to Walton’s trustworthiness question, backup question, and consistency question, respectively.

Neither Walton’s (2006) nor Wagemans’ (2011) account considers the specificities of DS and IS. For instance, both approaches imply that O was indeed asserted by someone in its fullness, without considering that in IS the speaker can interfere in the form of the content or even in the content itself. The question of whether the expert asserted or not the statement in O fits better to the DS only, as one would expect the reproduction of a speech act in its integrity or at least a close attempt to such reproduction.

Based on this scheme and the notions about reported speech in section 2.1, the next chapter presents an analysis of arguments from expert opinion coded by DS and IS and proposes modifications in the argument scheme for DS.

2 Methodology

The first step to achieving this goal is to identify the arguments from authority in essays and to sort them by type of reported speech. The corpus is composed of 24 essays written by students in the Brazilian National High School Exam (ENEM), distributed as follows: 8 essays from ENEM 2017; 9 essays from ENEM 2018; and 7 essays from ENEM 2019. The essays are made available yearly in the handbook Cartilha do Participante, and I have chosen the three years prior to the execution of this research.

The ENEM is an exam that contains 180 questions on Languages, Human Sciences, Natural Sciences, and Mathematics. In addition to the questions, the candidate must write an argumentative essay about a problem situation. The essay’s evaluation follows five criteria, one of which evaluates if the candidate “develops the thematic proposal through consistent argumentation, based on a productive socio-cultural repertoire and presents an excellent mastery of the argumentative text.” (BRASIL, 2019, p. 18)1. In order to achieve the maximum grade

---

1 Translated from: “Desenvolve o tema por meio de argumentação consistente, a partir de um repertório sociocultural produtivo e apresenta excelente domínio do texto dissertativo-argumentativo".
in this criterion, candidates usually rely on direct and indirect speech to anchor their argumentation on well-known knowledge and/or authority figures, as the exam guidelines classify this as “a productive socio-cultural repertoire”, hence its relevance as a rich corpus for this study.

Other works have indirectly studied reported speech in the ENEM essays. These works usually investigate the relationship between the author’s voice and other voices and authorship, however they do not intend to study if and how the IS and DS grammatical structures can play a role in how multiple voices appear in student’s essays. Costa & Bernardino (2021), for instance, argue that the forms of reported speech in ENEM not only exempts the writer from the responsibility for the fact being uttered, as it sets boundaries to the author’s voice and other voices, but also provides objectivity and credibility to their argumentation. However, they do not show if different grammatical structures could imply more or less objectivity or credibility.

Reported speech is also relevant when evaluating authorship in the ENEM essays, as shown by Nascimento (2021). The presence of multiple voices, specifically that of the author and that of authorities in certain fields of knowledge, and the development of the arguments to put forward a point of view are evidences of authorship. This could be done by means of DS and IS, though the author does not analyze these structures explicitly. Lima (2017), when analyzing the ENEM essays from a Bakhtinian perspective, shows how the voices of others are present in these texts by means of reported speech, but there is no strict correspondence between Bakhtin’s (2002) view on reported speech and IS and DS as understood in Section 1.1.

As shown, ENEM seems to be a rich corpus for research on all forms of reported speech and its relation to argumentation in a broad sense. However, a brief note over the limitations of the corpus must be made. A few works in academic literacies have shown that DS and IS have different uses. Boch & Grossmann (2002), for instance, show how experts and students rely on the speech of others in their essays. The authors find that reformulation, i.e. IS, is mostly used in the experts’ texts, as opposed to DS, mostly present in students’ texts. According to Boch & Grossmann (2002, p. 102), the reasons experts favor IS are that “firstly, reformulation is more economical and allows the thread of the analysis not to be lost. Secondly, it facilitates the control of enunciative management (the citation necessarily introduces
heterogeneity on this plane).” Among several reasons for students to use DS instead of IS, the authors hypothesize that avoidance of an incorrect reformulation is one of them, as students might perceive this strategy as more faithful.

The sort of distinction made by Boch & Grossmann (2002) regarding the level of expertise of the writers does not apply to the ENEM, as no background information about the participants is provided. Certainly, the background of the writer must play a role in how we perceive and analyze arguments, but to allow the control of such variables, new research needs to be carried out to expand the analysis using other corpora.

From an argumentative perspective, as mentioned previously, different contexts should also play a role in argument evaluation. This is illustrated by Carrascal (2014) analysis of arguments from expert opinion in philosophical academic papers, as the interlocutor typically assumes that published papers “automatically gives the author the status of being trustworthy, reliable, or at least worth considering; we trust the writer regarding the reliability of the quote; and so on” (CARRASCAL, 2014, p. 185). According to the author, this answers most of the critical questions related to the argument scheme, which is one of the main reasons why the critical questions proposed do not apply in this context to determine the acceptability of the argument.

Because there are no institutional expectations regarding the trustworthiness of reported speech in the ENEM as there is in published papers, it is not possible to assume along with Carrascal (2014) that the argument scheme and its critical questions cannot be applied. Furthermore, by assuming the distinction between the use of DS and IS, an investigation should be conducted to determine whether the structures used in argumentation also play a role in how argument schemes and critical questions apply.

The second step of this research concerns the identification of arguments from expert opinion with explicitly marked direct and indirect speech; then, these arguments were evaluated using Wagemans’ (2011) argument scheme provided in section 2. Finally, the third step involves a comparative analysis between DS and IS to establish their relation to the critical questions used in evaluating arguments from expert opinion.

---

2 Translated from: Em primeiro lugar, a reformulação é mais econômica e permite que não se perca o fio da análise. Em segundo lugar, ela facilita o controle do gerenciamento enunciativo (a citação introduz obrigatoriamente a heterogeneidade nesse plano).

3 In arguments from expert opinion, there is an appeal to a cognitive or epistemic authority rather than an appeal to a deontic or administrative authority that makes decisions about public policies.
3 Evaluating arguments

3.1 Argumentation schemes for DS and IS

As specified in section 1.1, this paper deals only with explicitly marked forms of direct and indirect speech. In DS, the reported content is marked in writing\(^4\) with quotation marks and usually can be introduced by a verbum dicendi (4) or by a modifier (5).

\(^{4}\) Although I consider for this paper only written modality, studies have shown differences in the prosody of DS and IS, allowing their identification in oral modality when there is a shift from a neutral intonation in IS to a less uniformity of intonation in DS, as a consequence of its “theatrical” feature. See Kvavik (1986) for a prosody study in Spanish; see Couper-Kuhlen (1996) and Klewitz & Couper-Kuhlen (1999) for a similar study in English.

(4) Nesse contexto, o filósofo iluminista Voltaire já afirmava: “Preconceito é opinião sem conhecimento” (BRASIL, 2018, p. 35).

In this context, the Enlightenment philosopher Voltaire already stated: “Prejudice is opinion without knowledge”.

(5) [...] segundo Immanuel Kant, “o homem é aquilo que a educação faz dele” (BRASIL, 2017, p. 37).

[...] according to Immanuel Kant, “man is merely what education makes of him”.

The DS might also be marked only with quotation marks in a separate sentence, followed by another sentence in which the source of information is revealed (6).

(6) “É mais fácil desintegrar um átomo que um preconceito”. Com essa frase, Albert Einstein desvelou os entraves que envolvem o combate às diversas formas de discriminação existentes na sociedade (BRASIL, 2017, p. 35).

“It is easier to smash an atom than a prejudice”. With this sentence, Albert Einstein unveiled the obstacles that involve combating the various forms of discrimination that exist in society.

Differently, IS is not marked with quotation marks and can be introduced by a verbum dicendi followed by a complement clause containing the reported content (7) or a modifier (8).

(7) O filósofo italiano Norberto Bobbio afirma que a dignidade humana é uma qualidade intrínseca ao homem, capaz de lhe dar direito ao respeito e à consideração por parte do Estado (BRASIL, 2018, p. 33).

The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio claims that human dignity is a quality intrinsic to man, capable of giving him the right to respect and to consideration by the State.
Although there are different markers of DS and IS, they do not play a role in the argument evaluation and are used in this paper only to identify the structures. For section 3.2, the sort of marker is disregarded, and only the DS and IS classification is taken into account.

To evaluate arguments, we ask questions related to the argument scheme proposed by Wagemans (2011, p. 335), presented in Section 1.

Consider (9):

(9) Nesse contexto, o filósofo iluminista Voltaire (E) já afirmava: “Preconceito é opinião sem conhecimento” (O) (BRASIL, 2018, p. 35).

In this context, the Enlightenment philosopher Voltaire (E) already stated: “Prejudice is opinion without knowledge” (O).

In (9), the standpoint “Preconceito é opinião sem conhecimento” (O) is considered to be acceptable because it was uttered by Voltaire (E), whom the speaker considers an expert. It is true indeed that (E) is an expert in the relevant field of the discussion, which renders the argument acceptable; however, the quotation would typically entail that there is a word-to-word reproduction or, at least, faithfulness regarding what was uttered, which is not the case, as Voltaire did not state that “prejudice is opinion without knowledge”. In fact, he stated that “Le préjugé est une opinion sans jugement.” [Prejudice is an opinion without judgment.] (VOLTAIRE, 1878, p. 264). Thus, even if the expert is credible and reliable, what is assumed to be a Discourse Act uttered by Voltaire is not.5

As quotations are usually presumed to be true until proven otherwise by contrary and sufficient evidence, the burden of proof shifts to the interlocutor (WALTON; MACAGNO, 2011). In this case, a disputant could argue and offer sufficient evidence that the speaker not only wrenches a quotation from context, but also misquotes the original words in order to strengthen their opinion. This is

---

5 Translations could play a role in evaluating the argument, as the translation of a DS itself is not precisely the words of the expert in the field. As pointed out by a reviewer, there could be a straw man fallacy in such cases, as the standpoint put forward could be distorted to some extent. This paper, however, does not intend to deal with translations in DS; they are only provided in order to facilitate the reading.
different from when the speaker uses their own assertions to support their standpoint, as in such case the speaker must commit themselves to the burden of supporting their assertions.

If the speaker wishes more freedom of reproduction, they could choose an IS construction. This construction does not trigger such a rigid evaluation, as the current speaker embeds the reported words into their own, i.e. they do not commit to a *verbatim* reproduction. Taking these differences into account, the evaluation scheme and the critical questions associated with it should be able to accommodate the specificities that arise from each grammatical structure.

As pointed out, the expert does not correlate prejudice to knowledge, but rather to judgment, which renders the argument fallacious as there is no evidence that (O) is faithful to what is asserted by (F). This is enough to evaluate the argument as unacceptable, which subsequently is supported by the backup evidence from the argument: if (E) did not say (O), therefore (E) is not able to provide further evidence for (O).

Given that the DS is the reproduction of someone else’s discourse act and the argumentative manoeuvre presupposes a certain degree of faithfulness to the form and content reported, a question such as *is O asserted by E?* is not enough. Rather, I propose that the focus of the argument in 1.1.1b should be the faithfulness of the quote. Though typically the burden of proof is shifted with quotations (WALTON; MACAGNO, 2011), the speaker must commit to their argumentation and be able to prove, if challenged, that the quote is indeed something that the expert asserted. Therefore, a question such as *is the form and content of the quote faithful?* arises to question the argument in 1.1.1b.

Consider the modifications in the argumentation scheme below:

ARGUMENT SCHEME FOR DS

1 O is true or acceptable.

1.1 O is asserted by expert E.

1.1.1a E is an expert in the relevant field F.

1.1.1b Source S proves that O is a faithful reproduction of both form and content of E’s discourse.

1.1’ Accepting that O is a faithful reproduction of both form and content of E’s discourse renders acceptable that O is true or acceptable.

1.1’.1a E is personally reliable.

1.1’.1b E is able to provide further evidence for O.

1.1’.1c O is consistent with what other (types of) experts on F assert.
The consequence of such an approach also changes the acceptability transfer principle in 1.1’, which now specifies the necessity of a quote being faithful to both form and content of the expert discourse.

Consider now the valid argument in (10), expressed by IS:

(10) Segundo o autor [Zygmunt Bauman] (E), o crescente desenvolvimento tecnológico, aliado ao incentivo ao consumo desenfreado, resulta numa sociedade que anseia constantemente por produtos novos e por informações atualizadas (O) (BRASIL, 2019, p. 43).

According to the author [Zygmunt Bauman] (E), the growing technological development, combined with the encouragement of unrestrained consumption, results in a society that constantly craves new products and up to date information (O).

In (10), (E) is an expert in the relevant field, and what is reported as the expert’s opinion indeed appears in his works, which renders it acceptable as the content of O is faithful to what is asserted by expert E. Furthermore, (E) is reliable, able to provide further evidence for (O), which is consistent with what other experts in the field assert. This confirms the validity of the lever: accepting that the content of O is faithful to what is asserted by E renders acceptable that O is true or acceptable. It is relevant to note that the reported content might not be an exact reproduction of the expert’s speech, as the structure allows more freedom of reproduction. In such a case, a slight adjustment to Wagemans (2011, p. 335) argument structure is necessary again:

ARGUMENT SCHEME FOR IS
1 O is true or acceptable.
1.1 O is asserted by expert E.
1.1.1a E is an expert in the relevant field F.
1.1.1b Source S proves that O is a faithful reproduction of the content of E’s discourse.
1.1’ Accepting that O is a faithful reproduction of the content of E’s discourse renders acceptable that O is true or acceptable.
1.1’.1a E is personally reliable.
1.1’.1b E is able to provide further evidence for O.
1.1’.1c O is consistent with what other (types of) experts on F assert.

Note that faithfulness to the form is no longer obligatory in 1.1.1b and 1.1’, as a reflection of the nature of IS. As seen so far, the modifications proposed to
Wagemans’ (2011) scheme concern precisely the argument in 1.1.1b and the acceptability transfer principle in 1.1’ in both DS and IS. In DS, the argument and the lever must comprehend the faithfulness to form and content of the assertion of E and, in IS, they must cover only the faithfulness to the content since the form may or may not be completely accurate.

3.2 Further distinctions between DS and IS

A further distinction can be made about the nature of DS and IS, although they do not interfere with the argument schemes. The first point to be highlighted relates to the truth value of the propositions. Consider (11):

(11) Segundo os sociólogos da chamada “Geração de 30”, muito importantes para o desenvolvimento da antropologia no país, o Brasil é formado por uma fricção interétnica (BRASIL, 2017, p. 41).

According to sociologists of the so-called “Generation of 1930”, who are very important for the development of anthropology in the country, Brazil is formed by interethic friction.

The class of individuals ‘Generation of 1930’ (Geração de 30) are experts in the field of sociology; however, the idea of ‘interethic friction’ (fricção interétnica) is attributed to one specific sociologist who published it in the 1960s. What is at stake in (11) is that the entire proposition is false since under no circumstances could the sociologists of the 1930s generation have used a concept created in the 1960s.

The difference that arises between DS and IS is that in DS one could evaluate the truth value of two different propositions: the one presented in the current speaker’s discourse and the one presented in the quote. (11) shows that in IS one entire proposition (containing the source and the content reported) is evaluated as true or false. A second difference is the fact that IS allows the presence of a class of experts instead of one individual. Unless the reported content is written in co-authorship, it is highly unlikely to attribute a single quote to more than one individual. However, in IS, one could claim that an idea was present in multiple works of experts in the same domain or framework, as shown by ‘Generation of 1930’ (Geração de 30) in (11).

Note that this reasoning entails that, in an argument with a valid expert, the consistency question is answered positively because of the collectivity since multiple experts are consistent with the other experts in the same group.
Conclusion

This paper intended to show the interaction between reported speech and argument evaluation; more specifically, the main question underlying this work was how DS and IS play a role in the argument scheme and its critical questions.

The literature shows that DS and IS are linguistic constructions that yield different evaluations. The DS is characterized by having two different discourse acts and, consequently, two deictic centres; the IS is regarded as having one discourse act and one deictic centre. A second difference between them is that in DS the reported content is assumed to be faithful in form and content, while in IS the current speaker embeds the reported content in their own speech.

In order to analyze the arguments from expert opinion, essays from three editions of the ENEM were selected because, in this type of text, students are required to anchor their argumentation on a productive social-cultural repertoire. To defend their standpoint, students often rely on the speech of well-known experts through arguments from expert opinion grammatically expressed by DS or IS, which makes the ENEM essays a rich corpus.

The analysis presented here leads to two argumentation schemes, each one with minor adjustments concerning the scheme proposed by Wagemans (2011). The consequence of different schemes for DS and IS in argumentation from expert opinion is the more precise manner in which critical questions can be applied to determine if an argument is fallacious.

Considering the aforementioned limitations of this study, it is still necessary to apply and test this proposal on different types of texts and contexts, because not only the acceptability of the expert opinion is affected by different contexts (see, for instance, Carrascal (2014)) but also because DS and IS might entail different uses depending on the level of instruction of speakers (see Boch and Grossmann (2002)).

By proposing a dialogue between argumentation and grammatical studies, though acknowledging the limits of the analysis, the ultimate ambition of this paper is to make room for further investigations into how grammatical structures might be relevant for argument evaluation. Hopefully, this could shed even more light on how speakers use grammatical structures to communicate their intentions, which could be relevant for analyzing languages and teaching language and writing.
References


EEMEREN, Frans H. van; GARSSEN, Bart; KRABBE, Erik C. W.; HENKEMANS, A. Francisca Snoeck; VERHEIJ, Bart; WAGEMANS, Jean H. M. *Handbook of argumentation theory*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014.


